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 1. Summary 
1.1 Background 
The Local Justice Reinvestment (LJR) Pilot was part of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 
commitment to test new approaches to criminal justice through Payment by Results (PbR) 
commissioning and has informed the government’s Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) 
reforms. Justice Reinvestment assumes that there are significant reductions in crime and 
offending to be made by partners working more effectively together at the local level. Cost 
savings, realised through lower demand on the Criminal Justice System (CJS), can then be 
reinvested back into the system. 
 
Six pilot sites were established – in Greater Manchester and the London boroughs of 
Croydon, Hackney, Lambeth, Lewisham and Southwark – covering both the adult and youth 
CJS in all sites except Hackney, which covered the adult CJS only. In these sites, local 
partners were free to target their resources on offenders in line with their local priorities and 
crime and/or reoffending patterns. They received a reward payment from MOJ if the cost of 
demand reduced by more than 5 per cent for adults and 10 per cent for youths, up to a 
maximum of 20 per cent, in either of the two test years (July 2011 to June 2012, July 2012 to 
June 2013) measured against the baseline period (July 2010 to June 2011). The value of the 
reward increased in line with greater reductions in the cost of demand, up to a maximum of 
20 per cent. 
 
The cost of demand was based on prices set for CJS metrics which included numbers of: 
custodial convictions of a specified duration; custody months for those convictions; 
community orders and suspended sentence orders; ‘other convictions’1; and probation 
requirements. Four sites2 in year 1 and five sites3 in year 2 achieved the targets and 
received reward payments based on savings which were shared between the sites and MO
(MOJ, 2012b; MOJ, 20
J 
13d). 
                                                
 
A process evaluation was commissioned to identify: what actions were taken by the sites; 
their effect on the CJS metrics indicated above, including how this affected the overall cost of 
demand on the CJS; perceived strengths and weaknesses in implementation; any 
unintended consequences on the CJS; and implications for policy and practice. This final 
1  Non custody and non court order convictions for offences such as summary motoring offences and non 
payment of TV licences. 
2  Greater Manchester, Lewisham, Hackney and Southwark. 
3  Greater Manchester, Lewisham, Hackney, Southwark and Lambeth. 
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 report draws together the findings from all the phases of the evaluation.4 An interim report 
focusing on the development and implementation of the pilot in year one, including details of 
interventions was published in 2013 (Wong et al, 2013). 
 
1.2 Interventions, investment and other initiatives and events at 
the sites 
In year one of the pilot three sites implemented new interventions; the other three 
implemented interventions that they had already planned but were accelerated by the pilot. In 
year two, the interventions in place across all six sites were a continuation of those 
implemented in the first year. Across both years, the London sites focused on reducing 
reoffending primarily through Integrated Offender Management (IOM), whereas Greater 
Manchester adopted a CJS redesign approach by supporting offenders at points of transition 
in the CJS (arrest, sentence, release and youth to adult). During the second year, Greater 
Manchester also developed an evidence based framework for justice service commissioning 
to facilitate this. 
 
Of the four sites receiving a reward payment after year one, the majority of the funding in 
Greater Manchester, Hackney and Southwark was allocated towards supporting adult 
offender management and sustaining existing services. In Lewisham, the majority of reward 
funding was allocated to functional family therapy for young people. It was not possible to 
obtain information on how year two reward allocations were targeted in the five sites 
receiving them due to the timing of the fieldwork. 
 
Wider policies and programmes also being delivered at the same time as the LJR pilot were 
perceived to have assisted sites in reducing demand on the CJS, for example: 
 A national adult sentencing proposal initiative (to reduce custodial sentences and 
probation requirements) by probation staff, which pre dated the pilot. 
 In London, The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) provided 
continuation funding for IOM. 
 In Greater Manchester, the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) co 
commissioned services supported by the reward funding and acted as banker for 
the reward grant. 
                                                
4  The methodology was primarily qualitative, involving three phases of interviews, workshops and focus groups 
with local agencies spanning the duration of the pilot. Analysis of changes to CJS metrics during the pilot was 
also undertaken. 
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  In Greater Manchester the Public Service Reform (PSR) programme enabled the 
practice, process and partnership changes initiated during the pilot to continue, 
and facilitated the development of an evidence based commissioning framework 
for justice services. 
 
1.3 Strengths and challenges in implementation 
Interviewees perceived that the strengths of the pilot were: 
 a focus on offenders with short sentences (under 12 months custody) in the 
London sites which pre dated the provision of statutory offender management for 
these offenders contained in the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014; 
 adopting a whole CJS approach to delivering justice services in Greater 
Manchester; 
 implementing the pilot across Greater Manchester and therefore benefiting from 
geographical scale such as shared risk among local authorities; 
 testing PbR commissioning of an offender management scheme in Lewisham;  
 developing evidence based commissioning and a local ‘what works’ evidence 
base in Greater Manchester;  
 enhancing partnership working; and 
 facilitating buy in to IOM by police officers in some of the London sites, by 
building their confidence in multi agency offender management processes.  
 
Interviewees perceived that the challenges of the pilot were: 
 the large number of metrics (e.g. 16 for adult demand) which made it challenging 
for the sites to decide what interventions to implement; 
 insufficient incentives (the lack of upfront funding and lack of a penalty if the 
target was not met) for the sites to substantially change practice and invest in 
new initiatives; 
 difficulties in obtaining buy in from local agencies to the concept of reducing the 
cost of demand as an outcome measure in the London sites; 
 the lack of a delivery framework to enable sites to link interventions they had 
implemented to the outcome metrics (in addition the sites perceived that as the 
project aimed to give sites local control over the implementation of the pilot, there 
was limited accountability); 
 differing operational priorities between local agencies; 
 the limited use of research evidence to inform delivery in the London sites; and 
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  limitations in the timeliness and type of management data provided by MOJ to 
inform delivery by the sites. 
 
1.4 Changes to criminal justice demand metrics 
As the study was designed as a process evaluation, without comparison areas, it was not 
possible to precisely identify the reasons for the changes in outcomes, and why performance 
varied across the sites. However, the actions taken by the sites and other external factors 
provided context within which the outcomes were examined. 
 
The overall cost of both adult and youth demand reduced in the majority of sites in both 
years and by more than that observed in England and Wales and Greater London. In the 
sites that met the cost of demand reduction targets, there was a reduction in the majority of 
the outcome metrics. There were reductions in the number and costs of probation 
requirements, but this may also have resulted from national policy changes operating outside 
the pilot. ‘Other convictions’ made an important contribution to the sites meeting the 
reduction in the cost of adult demand target, despite the offences likely to result in these 
convictions not being specifically targeted by the sites. This appeared to be due to the 
volume of ‘other convictions’ compared to other metrics, and the relatively high value of the 
estimated savings that could be realised from a reduction in ‘other convictions’ compared to 
other metrics. Figures may also have been affected by overall crime levels and the reporting 
behaviour of victims. 
 
1.5 Implications for policy 
The research has identified the following implications which may be helpful to policymakers, 
commissioners and providers in designing and delivering future initiatives: 
 Incentive based initiatives may benefit from: 
 outcome metrics which obtain buy in from providers and can be understood 
and monitored by providers using their own data;  
 upfront funding, a reward payment and a penalty mechanism;  
 providers articulating how their activities link to the outcome metrics and  
undertaking a minimum level of performance management and reporting to 
commissioners; 
 providers having the capacity and capability to analyse data to inform the 
design, implementation and monitoring of services; and  
 commissioners having sufficient capacity and capability to provide timely 
management data to providers. 
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  Individual agencies should be encouraged to deliver better criminal justice 
outcomes by reviewing and improving their own operating practices, rather than 
relying on partnership working as a panacea. 
 Developing an evidence base to support reliable investment decisions requires: 
 a central database/repository of robust research evidence; 
 local commissioning frameworks which require that the most robust 
evidence is available to support funding decisions; and 
 providers to use the best evidence available and, where this is absent, 
undertake robust evaluations of their own services. 
 Commissioners and providers need to allow adequate time to build their capacity 
and understanding of new commissioning frameworks, such as PbR.  
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 2. Introduction 
2.1 Background 
The Local Justice Reinvestment (LJR) Pilot was part of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 
commitment to test new approaches to criminal justice through Payment by Results (PbR) 
commissioning (MOJ, 2010a). The pilot aimed to: 
 test the premise that there were significant potential reductions in crime and 
reoffending to be made by partners working more effectively together at the local 
level;  
 understand the extent to which local partners were incentivised to change their 
behaviours; and  
 test a concept from which evidence could be generated to inform the 
development of policy on widening the use of PbR, local partnership working and 
local commissioning decisions (MOJ, 2011b). 
 
Justice Reinvestment (JR), as noted by Fox et al (2013), seeks to reduce the cost of crime in 
the most efficient way possible. It involves local agencies working together to reduce the 
drivers of criminal justice costs through the analysis of criminal justice data, mapping of 
interventions, use of evidence, and identification of cost effective interventions. Interest in JR 
has grown in recent years and was endorsed by the House of Commons Justice Committee 
(Justice Committee, 2010). The development of the LJR pilot was preceded and informed by 
other initiatives that aimed to test out a JR approach – for example, the Diamond Initiative.5 
 
Six LJR pilots were established in Greater Manchester6 and the London boroughs of 
Croydon, Hackney, Lambeth, Lewisham and Southwark. They covered both adult and youth 
Criminal Justice Systems (CJS) in all sites except Hackney, which covered the adult CJS 
system only.7 
 
Under the pilot model, local statutory partners were free to target their resources (without 
prescription from MOJ) on specific groups of adult (18 and over at time of conviction) and 
                                                
5  The Diamond Initiative commissioned by the London Criminal Justice Partnership was a resettlement scheme 
for offenders sentenced to less than 12 months in prison. It ran from 2009–11 in the London Boroughs of 
Croydon, Hackney, Haringey, Lambeth, Lewisham and Southwark (see Dawson et al, 2011). 
6  The local authorities of Manchester, Salford, Trafford, Tameside, Stockport, Wigan, Oldham, Rochdale, Bury, 
Bolton. 
7  The pilot only covered the adult system in Hackney as the area was also involved in the Youth Justice 
Custody Reinvestment Pathfinder. More information on this can be found in the Pathfinder final report (Wong 
et al, 2015). 
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 young (under 18 at time of conviction) offenders in line with their local priorities and crime 
and/or reoffending patterns.  
 
In contrast to two other MOJ PbR pilots, where the outcome payment was based on reducing 
reconvictions (MOJ, 2014), the LJR sites were rewarded if there was a reduction in the cost 
of demand on the CJS. The estimated saving that this created for MOJ was shared with the 
sites to reinvest in reducing reoffending and crime locally. The cost of demand was 
measured across the baseline year (July 2010 to June 2011), year one (July 2011 to June 
2012) and year two (July 2012 to June 2013). Local partners received a reward payment if 
the cost of demand reduced by more than 5 per cent for adults and 10 per cent for youths, in 
either of the two measurement years compared to the baseline. These are referred hereafter 
as the ‘demand reduction targets’. The size of the reward payment increased in line with 
greater reductions in the cost of demand, up to a maximum of 20 per cent. 
 
The cost of demand was measured using a range of metrics, and a total cost to MOJ for 
each site was calculated by multiplying these outcome metrics by an agreed price per metric. 
Prices were set based on what MOJ agencies8 agreed were the potential cashable financial 
savings from a reduction in each metric (MOJ, 2013b). The adult metrics were volumes of: 
 under 12 month adult custodial convictions and custody months from those 
convictions; 
 Community Orders and Suspended Sentence Orders;  
 ‘other convictions’ (non custody and non court order convictions) in magistrates’ 
courts); and  
 twelve probation requirements9 which each counted as individual metrics 
(detailed in Table A2.3).  
 
The youth metrics were volumes of: 
 under 24 month custodial convictions and custody months from those 
convictions; 
 Community Orders; and  
                                                
8  The agencies involved were National Offender Management Service (NOMS), Her Majesty’s Courts and 
Tribunal Service, Youth Justice Board (YJB) and the then Legal Services Commission. 
9  At the time of the LJR pilot there were 12 requirements. However since then, there have been amendments to 
the requirements available. A foreign travel prohibition requirement was introduced under the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012. A Rehabilitation Activity Requirement was 
introduced in February 2015 (as part of the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014), which replaced the supervision 
and activity requirements for offences committed after the provision came into force. 
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  ‘other convictions’ (non custody and non court order convictions) in magistrates’ 
courts. 
 
At the end of year one, four sites10 achieved the demand reduction targets and received 
reward payments totalling £3,623,000 (MOJ, 2012b). At the end of year two, five sites11 
achieved the demand reduction targets and received reward payments totalling £8,019,000 
(MOJ, 2013d).12 The reward payments were less than the estimated savings achieved and 
reflected the sharing of these savings between MOJ and the sites. 
 
Since the LJR pilot was introduced in July 2011, MOJ has proceeded with plans to roll out 
PbR at scale and transform the way in which adult offenders are rehabilitated. ‘Transforming 
Rehabilitation: a Strategy for Reform’, published in May 2013, set out the key facets of MOJ’s 
approach to reduce reoffending. Under the Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) reforms: 
 
1. The market has been opened up to a diverse range of new rehabilitation providers. 
2. New payment incentives for market providers have been introduced, to only pay them 
in full for specified reductions in reoffending. 
3. The majority of offenders released from custody (including the most prolific group of 
offenders – those sentenced to less than 12 months in custody) now receive statutory 
supervision in the community.  
4. A ‘through the prison gate’ resettlement service has been put in place, so most 
offenders will be given continuous support by one provider from custody into the 
community.  
5. A new public sector National Probation Service (NPS) has been created. 
 
The competition was launched in September 2013 (MOJ, 2013f), and on 1 June 2014 
transition to the new National Probation Service (NPS) and 21 Community Rehabilitation 
Companies (CRCs) took place. In October 2014 the preferred bidders to run the CRCs were 
announced. On 1 February 2015 the new providers took ownership of, and began running, 
the CRCs. On this date the remaining provisions of the Offender Rehabilitation Act (ORA) 
2014 also commenced. The most significant change introduced by the ORA was to extend 
                                                
10  Greater Manchester, Lewisham, Hackney and Southwark. 
11  Greater Manchester, Lewisham, Hackney, Southwark and Lambeth. 
12  Details of the results for year one and year two are included in Table A2.1. 
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 statutory supervision to offenders released from short prison sentences of less than 
12 months. 
 
PbR payments to CRC owners are dependent on reducing the proportion of people who 
commit further offences (binary measure) and reducing the total number of offences 
(frequency measure). 
 
While Justice Reinvestment is not the PbR model that MOJ is taking forward under the TR 
reforms, learning from the LJR pilot has informed the design of the reforms (for example, 
central to TR is the importance of partnership working and the need for a robust payment 
model). 
 
2.2 Research questions 
A process evaluation of the LJR pilot was commissioned by MOJ to answer the following 
research questions: 
1. What actions did local partners take to reduce crime, reoffending and demand on 
the CJS, and why? 
2. (How) Did the actions of local partners contribute to better CJS outcomes (including 
reduced first time offending, reoffending and CJS demand focused on the pilot 
outcome metrics)? 
3. What were the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the project as 
implemented? 
4. Were there any unintended consequences/impacts on other parts of the CJS and/or 
crime in the area (or neighbouring areas), and/or were any perverse incentives 
created? 
5. What lessons can be learned to inform the development of policy in relation to PbR, 
local commissioning of services and reducing reoffending, and what are the 
implications for policy? 
 
This final evaluation report draws together findings from all phases of the research to answer 
all the research questions. The interim evaluation report (Wong et al, 2013), focused on the 
development of the pilot and year one implementation, including full details about the 
interventions implemented.  
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 2.3 Methodology 
The methodology for this process evaluation was primarily qualitative. The fieldwork was 
conducted in three phases: November 2011 to February 2012; July to November 2012, and 
September to December 2013. Across the six pilot sites the three phases of the fieldwork 
involved 193 interviews with stakeholders, and a total of 15 workshops and one focus group 
involving 116 participants (some participating more than once).13 Participants included: MOJ 
staff; senior local authority managers; community safety managers; Youth Offending Team 
(YOT) managers; senior and operational probation managers; police officers; managers from 
the Voluntary and Community Sector (VCS) agencies; sentencers and senior court staff; 
managers from the Police and Crime Commissioners’ (PCC) offices; and research and data 
managers from local authorities, criminal justice boards, probation, and PCC offices. 
 
The interview findings were supplemented by documentary evidence relating to the 
implementation of the pilot across the six sites. Changes in the outcome metrics during the 
course of the pilot were also assessed. Further details of the methodology and limitations are 
contained in Appendices 1 and 2. 
 
2.4 Interpreting the findings 
The qualitative findings are based on purposively selected interviews. Not all interviewees 
had the same degree of direct involvement with the implementation of the pilot. As a result, 
the conclusions and learning presented in this report may not be representative of all 
stakeholder views held across the six pilot sites, and need to be interpreted with a degree of 
caution. With regard to the analysis of criminal justice demand data, in the absence of 
comparator sites it was not possible to directly attribute changes in demand to the pilot. This 
study was commissioned as a process evaluation and was not intended to measure impact. 
 
2.5 Report outline 
Chapter 3 summarises the governance arrangements at each of the sites, outlines the 
interventions implemented by the sites during the pilot, summarises how the reward payment 
from year one was allocated and examines other initiatives that may have impacted on the 
pilot. Chapter 4 identifies the strengths and challenges in the implementation of the pilot.  
 
                                                
13  The workshops included theory of change workshops in Phase 1, system mapping workshops in Phase 2, and 
data review workshops in Phase 3. 
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 Chapter 5 examines the performance of the sites against the metrics and identifies factors 
that may have contributed to the results. Chapter 6 outlines the main conclusions and 
implications for policy based on the lessons learned from both years of the pilot. 
11 
 3. Interventions, investment and other initiatives and 
events at the sites 
This chapter examines the actions undertaken by the sites to reduce criminal justice demand 
and the context in which the pilot was implemented. It outlines governance arrangements for 
the pilot, summarises the interventions implemented, details how sites allocated year one 
reward payments and considers other initiatives which may have impacted on the pilot. 
 
3.1 Governance 
Greater Manchester established an executive board to oversee delivery of the pilot, chaired 
by the Chief Constable with senior representatives from local authorities, probation, the 
Crown Prosecution Service, courts and the Voluntary and Community sector. In the London 
sites, governance of the pilot rested with the local community safety partnership and 
reducing reoffending structures. Across all sites, the agencies which had the main 
operational involvement were probation, the local authority and the police. Apart from in 
Greater Manchester, YOTs had limited operational involvement in implementing the pilot. 
There was limited involvement of courts in some sites, due to concerns by local stakeholders 
of an adverse response from the judiciary to the outcome of the pilot – demand reduction. 
 
3.2 Interventions delivered during the pilot 
The interview findings indicate that, during year one, some new interventions were 
implemented in three sites as part of the pilot. However, the majority of the interventions 
implemented across all the sites were either interventions that pre dated the pilot or 
interventions that the sites had planned to implement but were accelerated by the pilot (see 
Table 3.1). Details of these interventions can be found in the interim report (Wong et al, 
2013). The interventions undertaken by all the sites in year two were a continuation of 
interventions implemented during year one (see also Table 3.1). However, in year two, 
Greater Manchester also implemented an evidence based commissioning framework which 
was in line with the strategic CJS design approach to managing offenders that was adopted 
by Greater Manchester in both years of the pilot. In the London sites the focus of service 
delivery was on adult offenders across both years of the pilot.  
 
The rationale for decisions on interventions in year two was consistent with that of year one. 
The underpinning rationale in the London sites remained that a focus on reducing 
12 
 reoffending, primarily through Integrated Offender Management (IOM),14 fitted with local 
priorities, and would ultimately reduce demand on the CJS. The development of the IOM 
schemes was, in part, based on the earlier Diamond Initiative. In Greater Manchester, 
stakeholders were committed to retaining the CJS model of justice reinvestment15 focused 
on supporting offenders at points of transition in the CJS (arrest, sentence, release and youth 
to adult)16 that had underpinned year one activity. They also ensured that the pilo
complemented and was integrated with wider activities under the Public Service Reform 
(PSR) programme (see section 3.4 for more details). 
t 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of year one and year two key interventions (shaded interventions 
were new arising from the pilot) 
Site Year 1 – Interventions and processes Year 2 – Interventions and processes 
Diversion to more cost effective interventions 
based on points of transition (arrest, sentence, 
release, youth to adult)18 including a focus on 
sentencing proposals by probation 
Continuation of work on points of transition, 
including a focus on sentencing proposals by 
probation 
Intensive alternatives to custody (IAC) in three 
local authority areas 
IAC orders were rebranded as Intensive 
Community Orders (ICOs) 
Small scale pilots: 
 conditional cautioning (drugs, alcohol, 
adult female offenders) 
 women’s custody triage 
 women’s attendance centres 
 neighbourhood justice panels 
Continuation of pilots 
Street Restorative Justice Continuation of Street Restorative Justice 
Roll out of IOM across ten local authorities Continuation of IOM 
Greater 
Manchester17 
 Evidence based commissioning framework 
Croydon Intensive Supervision Model19 
Voluntary Supervision Model20 
Continuation of Intensive Supervision Model 
Continuation of Voluntary Supervision Model 
                                                
14  ‘Integrated Offender Management is an overarching framework which allows local and partner agencies to 
come together to ensure that the offenders which cause most damage and harm locally are managed in a co 
ordinated way.’ Definition provided by the Home Office at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime/reducing-
reoffending/iom/  
15  Fox et al (2013) have proposed that a CJS model of justice reinvestment seeks to divert offenders at different 
points in the CJS to more cost effective alternatives.   
16  This was adjusted during year one to also focus on female offenders, offenders aged between 16 and 21, and 
IOM offenders. 
17  A more detailed list of the interventions implemented by Greater Manchester can be found in Wong et al, 
2013. 
18  Examples of diversionary interventions included: at point of arrest, increasing the use of out of court disposals; 
at point of sentence, a targeted services court which aimed to divert offenders with mental health problems to 
appropriate services. Some of these were based on existing research evidence; others were being evaluated 
(Wong et al, 2013). 
19  This was based on the Intensive Alternatives to Custody programme which was piloted in a number of areas 
across the country (see Hansbury, 2011), including Greater Manchester. 
20  This involved VCS agencies engaging with low level non-statutory offenders (particularly on release from 
custody) and providing them with support and assistance. This was part of Croydon's IOM programme. 
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 Site Year 1 – Interventions and processes Year 2 – Interventions and processes 
Hackney IOM (extending PPO21 work; co location of 
joint agency team) 
Continuation of IOM (changed provider for non 
statutory offenders from VCS to probation) 
Lambeth IOM Continuation of IOM 
Lewisham PbR commissioned IOM scheme22 for non 
statutory offenders23 (delivered by VCS 
agency) 
Continuation of PbR commissioned IOM 
scheme for non statutory offenders 
Southwark IOM Scheme 
Focus on sentencing proposals by probation  
Continuation of IOM 
Continuation of focus on sentencing proposals 
by probation 
 
3.3 Year one reward payment 
Investment of year one payment 
Four sites achieved their demand reduction targets in year one and were allocated a reward 
payment. Table 3.2 summarises how this was allocated.24 The reward payments were 
received six months into year two of the pilot (January 2013) with no time restrictions on 
spending. This meant that by the end of the pilot (June 2013) the funding had been spent 
partially in some sites while others were still at the allocation stage. Only some of the 
interventions funded from the year one payment were implemented by the sites in year two. 
These are indicated by the shaded cells in Table 3.2.25 The majority of funding in Greater 
Manchester, Hackney and Southwark was allocated towards supporting adult offender 
management, whereas in Lewisham the majority of funding was allocated to functional family 
therapy26 for young people. Due to the timing of fieldwork, no data was available about how 
the year two reward payment was to be allocated. 
 
                                                
21  Prolific and priority offenders. 
22  As detailed in the interim report (Wong et al, 2013), Lewisham commissioned a voluntary sector agency to 
deliver a PbR service based on a Drugs Intervention Programme contract, but with a remit broadened to 
include reoffending. 
23  Non-statutory offenders were those in receipt of an under 12 month custodial conviction who would not have 
normally received probation supervision following release from prison. 
24  This data was provided and validated by the sites.  
25  Due to the timing of the fieldwork it was not possible to verify if the other initiatives that were to be funded by 
the year one payment (but not commenced in year two) were implemented.  
26  A psychological treatment for young people. 
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 Table 3.2: Allocation of year one funding 
Main interventions which were allocated reward funding and percentage 
of the reward payment apportioned to each intervention* Site and 
year one 
reward 
payment  
Co ordination of the 
LJR pilot 
Adult offender 
management 
(including IOM) 
Reducing reoffending 
pathways services 
for adults 
Support services for 
young offenders 
Greater 
Manchester 
£2,670,000 
Programme management, 
business development and 
data analysis** 27 (3%) 
ICOs** (70%) 
Services for women 
offenders** (19%) 
N/A Resettlement support 
(2%) 
Hackney 
£189,000 
N/A IOM co ordination 
and delivery (56%) 
Housing, alcohol and 
counselling for IOM 
offenders (24%) 
Diversion activities for 
young offenders (8%) 
Lewisham 
£249,000 
N/A N/A Employment 
programme (32%) 
Functional family 
therapy (68%) 
Southwark 
£514,000 
N/A IOM co ordination 
and delivery (63%) 
Mental health, 
employment for IOM 
offenders, (17%) 
Mental health, user 
participation, 
employability (14%) 
The shaded cells indicate that these interventions were implemented in year two. 
* The table identifies the main interventions funded, therefore the apportionments of funding may not total to 
100 per cent. 
** Whilst these interventions were part of the LJR pilot, they also formed part of the PSR programme in Greater 
Manchester (see section 3.4). 
 
Rationale for allocating the reward payment  
Across the four sites, the main rationale for spending the year one reward payment was to 
ensure sustainability of services. Interviewees in the London sites regarded the year one 
reward payment as a one off, non recurring sum. Therefore their allocation of spending over 
a two to four year period was based on anticipation of not receiving further reward funding at 
the end of year two. 
 
Interviewees in Greater Manchester reported that the uncertainty felt locally about the effect 
of TR on future services contributed to delays in allocating and spending the reward 
payment. Interviewees in the three sites which invested reward funding in adult offender 
management expressed concerns about ensuring the longevity of this provision, when the 
new tier one providers28 became responsible for delivery under the TR reforms. To facilitate 
the sustainability of interventions funded by the year one payment (such as ICOs), managers 
involved in the pilot in Greater Manchester met with potential TR tier one providers to 
promote the financial benefits of maintaining them.  
 
                                                
27  Having a dedicated co ordination resource was a key issue that was identified by interviewees during year one 
of the pilot (Wong et al, 2013). 
28  Tier one providers are those that are directly contracted with MOJ to run Community Rehabilitation 
Companies (CRCs). These contracts were signed in December 2014, with the transfer of ownership of all 
CRCs taking place in February 2015. 
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 3.4 Other initiatives  
The LJR pilot was implemented during a time when other policies and programmes were 
also being delivered. The initiatives which the sites identified as having the most impact on 
the implementation of the pilot were: 
 The national sentencing proposal initiative undertaken by probation staff across 
England and Wales from 2008; 
 Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) who were elected to office across 
England and Wales in November 2012;29 and 
 the Public Service Reform (PSR) programme which affected the implementation 
of the LJR pilot in Greater Manchester. 
 
Changes to adult sentencing proposals 
Probation interviewees across the sites reported that in 2008 (prior to the LJR pilot) probation 
trusts had been encouraged to review their approach to sentencing proposals.30  
 
Probation interviewees reported that these processes typically involved probation staff 
devising sentencing proposals which aimed to: 
 more appropriately respond to the needs of individual offenders and their risk of 
reoffending – for example, by proposing one to one interventions to address 
offending behaviour rather than group programmes; 
 make better use of sentencing guidelines and counsel guidance to support their 
proposals; and 
 where appropriate, divert offenders from custody by proposing robust community 
orders and for other offenders (not at risk of custody) reduce the numbers of 
requirements attached to community orders.  
 
Probation staff indicated that, across the sites, these processes were continued by probation 
during the pilot and may have assisted the sites in reducing demand on the CJS. 
 
                                                
29  Under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, PCCs were introduced with the aim of making 
the police accountable to the public. PCCs are also responsible for working in partnership with a number of 
agencies at a local and national level. In London Police, funding was transferred to the Mayor’s Office for 
Policing and Crime (MOPAC).  
30  It was reported that probation trusts received a total of £40m to promote community orders as an alternative to 
under 12 month custodial sentences. This was confirmed by a memorandum, submitted by MOJ, to the House 
of Commons Justice Select Committee (MOJ, 2010b). 
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 Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) 
Across the London sites the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) facilitated the 
implementation of the pilot by providing funding to continue the delivery of IOM during the 
latter part of year two (from April 2013). Interviewees indicated that the MOPAC contribution 
to IOM was part of a funding mix which included local authority funding, public health funds 
and in kind contributions such as dedicated police officers as part of the IOM team. In two of 
the London sites the year one reward payment was also used to support IOM delivery. 
 
In Greater Manchester, the PCC facilitated the implementation of the pilot by:  
 taking over from the Chief Constable as the chairperson of a reconfigured 
executive board which was established to oversee the legacy of the pilot; 
 acting as the banker for the LJR reward payment; and  
 becoming a co commissioner along with the police, probation and local 
authorities for the new service delivery models which were to be commissioned 
using the LJR reward payment. 
 
Public Service Reform (PSR) programme 
During year two, the Greater Manchester pilot became integrated with the PSR programme 
which was established to reduce demand on public services.31 This benefited the LJR pilot in 
the following ways: 
 Legacy – the PSR programme was due to be implemented over a five year 
period. While the LJR pilot ended in June 2013, the inclusion of criminal justice 
services as a key theme within the PSR programme enabled the practice, 
process and partnership changes initiated during the pilot to continue. 
 Linkages to other social policy agendas – the PSR programme enabled the pilot 
to make linkages to other social policy areas of the programme such as: early 
years, worklessness, low skills and troubled families (Communities and Local 
Government Select Committee, 2013). This enabled the pilot to develop from a 
CJS model of justice reinvestment to a more social justice model of justice 
reinvestment as noted by Fox et al, (2013) and Allen (2014).  
 
                                                
31  The PSR programme followed on from the Whole Place Community Budgets pilot which ran from March to 
October 2012 and aimed to deliver effective joint investment between local agencies to reduce dependency 
and support growth. The PSR programme aimed to jointly commission services in four thematic areas: early 
years; transforming criminal justice; troubled families; and health and social care (Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority, 2013).  
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 The LJR pilot provided reciprocal benefits for the PSR programme. In particular, the reward 
payment from year one was used to fund the co ordination costs of the LJR pilot and the 
criminal justice element of the PSR programme. The funding also enabled the roll out of 
ICOs and offender management and support services for female offenders. These were two 
of the new service delivery models identified for roll out across Greater Manchester under the 
PSR programme. 
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 4. Strengths and challenges in implementation 
This chapter examines the perceived strengths and challenges in the implementation of the 
pilot and how the sites responded to incentives, based on interview and workshop findings. 
 
4.1 Strengths 
The following were perceived by interviewees as key strengths arising from the 
implementation of the pilot: 
 a focus on non statutory adult offenders in the London sites; 
 adopting a whole system approach to delivering justice services in Greater 
Manchester; 
 the benefits of scale in Greater Manchester; 
 testing PbR commissioning in Lewisham;  
 developing an evidence based commissioning framework and local ‘what works’ 
evidence base in Greater Manchester;  
 enhancing partnership working and; 
 building confidence among police officers in multi agency offender management 
processes in some of the London sites. 
 
Focus on non statutory offenders 
In the London sites, the earlier Diamond Initiative supported non statutory offenders (those 
serving custodial sentences of less than 12 months who, because of their sentence length, 
would otherwise not have received any statutory community support). The LJR pilot enabled 
this focus of provision to continue.32  
 
Interviewees from Hackney, Lambeth, Lewisham and Southwark reported targeting non 
statutory adult offenders at high risk of reoffending (in relation to acquisitive crime), as part of 
the cohort of offenders managed under IOM. In Croydon, non statutory offenders were 
targeted through intensive supervision models, IOM and the voluntary supervision model.  
 
                                                
32  This focus on offenders with under 12 month custodial convictions pre dated the change introduced by the 
Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014 for the provision of statutory offender management services to offenders with 
short sentences (under 12 months) following their release from prison. This is a key part of the TR programme 
(MOJ, 2013f). 
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 Adopting a whole system approach to the delivery of justice services 
In Greater Manchester, the pilot facilitated the development of a whole system approach to 
reducing crime, offending and demand which focused on key transition points in the CJS: 
arrest, sentencing, release from prison and between youth and adult systems. This involved 
identifying less expensive but effective interventions at each of the key transition points and 
diverting individuals to them: for example, diverting an individual at the point of sentence, 
from a short custodial sentence to an ICO.  
 
This approach accords with the CJS model of justice reinvestment advocated by La Vigne 
et al (2010; 2013). The system approach was also intended to underpin the allocation of the 
potential year two reward payment.33 However, interviewees in Greater Manchester 
acknowledged that during the pilot they were inhibited from fully implementing the systems 
approach by insufficient resources. They suggested that this accounted for less effective 
performance (compared to some of the London sites which did not implement such an 
approach) against the adult metrics of under 12 month custodial convictions and custody 
months for under 12 month custodial convictions (see section 5.1). 
 
Benefits of scale 
Greater Manchester decided to implement the pilot across all ten local authorities. 
Interviewees from this site reported that this provided the following benefits of geographical 
scale: 
 a sufficient volume of discharged prisoners to provide economies of scale in 
establishing resettlement support; 
 the opportunity to share risk across agencies and local authorities to mitigate 
against unexpected events such as the August 2011 disturbances (explored 
further in section 5.5) which had the potential to impact on outcome metrics; and 
 the potential for more cost effective engagement with courts, sentencers and 
prisons. 
 
Testing PbR commissioning 
Interviewees in some of the London sites indicated that the pilot had contributed to their 
learning about PbR commissioning. Lewisham, in response to the pilot, commissioned a PbR 
offender management scheme based on a drugs intervention programme and used Police 
                                                
33  At the time when the fieldwork was undertaken the year two results had not been published. However, the 
sites had received management information for three quarters of year two which had given them an indication 
about whether or not they were likely to receive a year two reward payment. 
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 National Computer (PNC) data on reconviction as the outcome measure. The pilot increased 
their understanding of the time required for market development and the need to support 
providers in bidding under these new commissioning arrangements. It also enabled greater 
understanding of some of the challenges in accessing PNC data. The difficulties were due to 
data protection issues in relation to these highly sensitive data and availability of resources at 
MOJ which resulted in the site having to access locally held reconviction data for each 
offender. This was time consuming and resource intensive, and highlighted the difficulties in 
introducing PbR based on outcomes for which the commissioner does not own the data 
required to measure those outcomes.  
 
Developing an evidence based commissioning framework and local ‘what 
works’ evidence base 
Greater Manchester allocated the year one reward payment using a six stage evidence 
based commissioning framework underpinned by cost benefit analysis and a requirement for 
funded initiatives to be sustainable (Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Greater 
Manchester, 2013). The co commissioning process (involving the police, probation, PCC and 
local authorities) was valued by the interviewees who were closely involved in leading the 
implementation of the LJR pilot and/or the criminal justice theme of the PSR programme. 
However, interviewees from public and voluntary sector agencies, who were less closely 
involved, expressed concerns about perceived delays in the time taken to commission 
services using the payment and the complexity of the model. For example, the difficulties of 
developing investment agreements between agencies based on calculating cashable returns 
from cost savings arising from reductions in demand. 
 
Interviewees in Greater Manchester also reported that, in addition to the evidence based 
commissioning framework, the pilot had prompted local agencies to develop a wider 
evidence base of interventions, using research evidence and through the monitoring and 
evaluation of interventions they had delivered as part of the pilot.  
 
Enhancing partnership working 
While partnership working was intended to be an important feature of the pilot, the choice of 
outcome metrics was not itself a driver for partnership working, as the metrics reflected the 
core business of just two agencies, probation and YOTs. Potentially the metrics could be 
directly affected by the actions of these two individual agencies without the need to engage 
with other partners, other than sentencers, although out of court disposals which affect the 
21 
 number of cases being dealt with by courts would potentially require the involvement of the 
police and the CPS. 
 
However, interviewees from all the sites reported that the pilot had acted as a catalyst to 
‘bring lots of different people with an interest in the system together’ (Local authority 
manager). They reported that this had facilitated the development of more effective working 
relationships between police, probation, local authorities, VCS agencies and prisons.  
 
In Greater Manchester the senior level involvement of the police, probation, YOTs and local 
authorities (with the Chief Constable chairing the executive board throughout most of the 
pilot) was regarded as critical to its effective implementation. In addition, being able to draw 
on data analysis and cost benefit analysis expertise from the local criminal justice board, 
local authorities, YOTs and probation was considered crucial in providing the capacity and 
capability to support the implementation of the pilot and the development of an evidence 
based commissioning framework for local justice services.  
 
In London, MOPAC facilitated the implementation of the pilot by convening regular meetings 
of local authority, probation and police leads from the London pilot sites to share information 
and identify ways to address common issues. 
 
Building police confidence in offender management processes 
Police interviewees in some of the London sites indicated that the direct involvement of 
police officers in the implementation of IOM (as part of the pilot) had built their confidence 
and experience around the efficacy of offender management, despite some offenders 
returning to offending. This confidence facilitated their buy in to the multi agency IOM 
arrangements. However, this was not consistent across all the London sites as detailed in 
4.2 below. 
 
4.2 Challenges 
The following were perceived by interviewees as key challenges in the implementation of the 
pilot: 
 design of the pilot, such as the large number of metrics and insufficient 
incentives; 
 difficulties in obtaining buy in to demand reduction as the outcome measure; 
 perceived lack of a delivery framework and accountability mechanism; 
 differing local operational priorities; 
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  use of research evidence to inform delivery in the London sites; and 
 use of data to inform the delivery of the pilot. 
 
Design of the pilot 
Interviewees reported that the design of the pilot presented challenges for the sites. First, the 
large number (16 for adult demand)34 and type of metrics which contributed to the demand 
reduction targets were challenging for the sites. In both years of the pilot, the outcome 
metrics themselves were not the primary rationale for decisions about which interventions to 
implement or how to use the year one reward payment (see sections 3.2 and 3.3 for more 
details). The complexity of the metrics meant that the London sites were unable to determine 
conclusively what activities in year one had led to them receiving (or not) a reward payment. 
Thus this had a limited impact on decisions about which interventions to implement during 
year two.  
 
‘we haven’t really focused our interventions specifically around the model, it’s 
more that we’ve said our core business is reducing reoffending and if we’re 
successful in that we hope that a secondary result will be a reduction in the 
overall number of people going through.’ (Local authority manager) 
 
In Greater Manchester, there was a much greater focus on the specific metrics and data for 
the pilot, but even there the complexity of the metrics and assessing the impact of individual 
activities on demand across all the measures was challenging. This necessarily limited the 
extent to which reducing demand on the outcome metrics was the rationale for decisions 
about which interventions to implement during year two (and year one): 
 
‘What nobody has done, or I haven’t picked up, is make a single investment 
decision based on an ability to influence an outcome [metric] for year two. I don’t 
think anybody’s made an investment decision that says “if we reinvest some of 
our money into this delivery we will reduce demand on the system by X and 
consolidate our ability to get a payment in year two”, because I think it’s so 
complicated to work out.’ (Local authority manager) 
 
                                                
34  Each of the probation requirements counted as an individual metric. 
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 ‘Other convictions’ (non custody and non court order convictions) such as fines for the non 
payment of television licences35 were included in the metrics. Interviewees reported that 
early modelling undertaken by some sites indicated that reducing ‘other convictions’ could 
have made a considerable contribution to the overall reduction in demand (this was later 
confirmed by analysing data from all sites – see section 5.2). So, the structure of the pilot 
meant that there was an incentive for the sites to focus more on reducing this metric over 
and above the others. However, interviewees across all sites reported that they instead 
decided to direct their efforts to reduce crime and reoffending in relation to offences that they 
and the public would perceive as being more serious, such as domestic burglary, theft from a 
motor vehicle and robbery.  
 
Second, as identified in the interim report (Wong et al, 2013) the lack of upfront funding and 
the lack of a penalty (if the outcome target was not met) provided insufficient incentives for 
the sites to substantially change what they did and/or invest substantial resources in new 
initiatives. This was illustrated during year one by the lack of investment across the sites in 
new youth justice interventions. 
 
Difficulties in obtaining buy in to demand reduction as the outcome measure 
Interviewees in some of the London sites suggested that it had been difficult obtaining buy in 
to the pilot from some partner agencies due to the focus on demand reduction and the choice 
of metrics. For example, in one site, interviewees reported problems engaging the police: 
 
‘for them [the police] it was irrelevant whether we reduced a sentence, whether 
we got someone in for 12 months, or less than 12 months that would have got a 
higher category [of sentence], for them it would be is this person a burglar, is it a 
repeat offender, are they on drugs, what are we doing about them?’ (Local 
authority manager) 
 
As indicated in the interim report (Wong et al, 2013), during year one, strategic managers in 
Greater Manchester were able to overcome this challenge by articulating a vision for the pilot 
which linked it to local priorities around localism, the Whole Place Community Budget pilot 
and, during year two, the PSR programme.  
 
                                                
35  Television licence fines were removed from the metrics during year one following a review by MOJ, as they 
were regarded as being outside the control and influence of local agencies. 
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 In contrast to the LJR pilot, the demand reduction metric used in another reinvestment model 
(the Youth Justice Reinvestment Custody Pathfinder) was simpler with just youth custody 
bed nights. The simplicity of this measure meant that it was easily understood by local 
agencies and enabled buy in from YOTs and other local partners as this aligned to their 
values – that reducing the use of custody would deliver better outcomes for young people 
(Wong et al, 2015). 
 
Differing local operational priorities  
In some of the London sites interviewees indicated that the implementation of a new policing 
approach (away from a localised to a centralised model) had had the potential to act as a 
barrier, by initially not including IOM as part of the policing model. In another London site, 
there were different operational priorities between the police and probation around which 
offenders should be included in IOM. Some interviewees thought that this resulted in limited 
buy in to IOM from the police. 
 
Perceived lack of a delivery framework and accountability mechanism 
While Greater Manchester responded to the pilot with a structured approach to delivery, 
interviewees from the London sites suggested that there was a lack of clarity about how the 
aim of the pilot was to be achieved and how this was demonstrated: 
 
‘there wasn’t an intellectual narrative that ran through it and said “this is the aim, 
this is what we want you to try and achieve and therefore you can target your 
work to that”’ (Local authority manager) 
 
The interview data from the London sites suggested that stakeholders did not think through 
their interventions in a way which allowed them to effectively manage their performance in 
relation to the outcome of the pilot. By way of illustration, in relation to IOM, which was the 
primary intervention implemented across the London sites, local agencies kept a record of 
the number of offenders they managed and how many were reconvicted of further offences. 
However, they were unable to demonstrate: 
 how this impacted on the individual metrics and the outcome measure – the cost 
of demand; and 
 how the number of offenders managed under IOM was intended to reduce crime 
and reoffending.  
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 In addition, some interviewees from the London sites also suggested that the ‘light touch’ 
approach to the management of the programme36 by MOJ and NOMS did not sufficiently 
hold the sites to account for the implementation of the pilot and the delivery of the outcome 
measure.  
 
Use of research evidence 
As detailed in section 4.1, the interview findings indicated that Greater Manchester made use 
of the available research evidence to support the development of new service delivery 
models. In the London sites, there was a less systematic use of evidence due to: 
 Perceived limitations of the evidence base. 
 A lack of resources to research and collate relevant evidence. 
 A lack of incentive due to the design of the pilot to implement a wider range of 
interventions. Instead, the choice of interventions was based on local practitioner 
experience of previous schemes (such as the Diamond Initiative) and experience 
from other areas such as Bristol’s IOM initiative.37  
 
Use of data to inform the delivery of the pilot 
Interviewees in the London sites indicated that there were limitations around what they were 
able to learn from the quarterly management data (on the outcome metrics and cost of 
demand) provided by MOJ. Their perception was that the data did not explain the differences 
in performance between the sites at the end of year one. 
 
Across all sites, interviewees were concerned about the timeliness of management data 
provided by MOJ for sites to performance manage the delivery of the pilot. The data were 
provided three months after the end of each quarter and reflected the time required to 
compile and quality assure the figures. However, the sites should have had (or been able to 
seek out) access to local data without waiting for centrally provided periodic updates. It 
should be noted that Greater Manchester made use of more timely local data which they 
later verified with the management data provided by MOJ. The interview data indicated that 
the London sites undertook limited performance management in relation to the pilot, focusing 
instead on service delivery. 
 
                                                
36  It was intended that the pilot adopt a ‘light touch’ approach in keeping with Government policy around freeing 
local agencies from central control (MOJ, 2010a). 
37  Further information on this can be found in the process evaluation of five integrated offender management 
pioneer areas by Senior et al., 2011. 
26 
 In addition to timeliness, interviewees expressed concerns about the capacity of MOJ to 
provide additional data to support the implementation of the pilot, such as the numbers of 12 
month and over custodial convictions, to enable sites to assess any displacement effects.38  
 
Interviewees in Greater Manchester indicated that while they had access to local data for 
most of the metrics, in relation to curfews (which made a large contribution to the numbers of 
probation requirements)39 it was difficult to validate local data with national data. 
 
                                                
38  For example, whether reductions in under 12 month custodial convictions might have been due to increases in 
12 month and over custodial convictions. 
39  After unpaid work orders and supervision, curfews were the most numerous probation requirements during the 
baseline and both years of the pilot. 
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 5. Changes to criminal justice demand metrics 
This chapter examines the changes to the criminal justice demand metrics and discusses 
possible reasons for the changes. It contextualises these changes by presenting trends in 
other CJS outcomes (first time offending, reoffending and police recorded crime) over the 
course of the pilot. As this study was designed as a process evaluation, without comparison 
areas or much locally collected data on interventions (see section 4.2), it was not possible to 
precisely identify the reasons for the changes in outcomes, and why performance varied 
across the sites.  
 
The quantitative findings are based on an analysis of criminal justice data provided by MOJ 
and from other published government sources. Appendix 2 contains the data and analysis 
from which the findings are drawn and details the sources of the raw data for the outcome 
metrics. Data for Greater London and England and Wales (where available) have been 
included to provide a context for the sites’ performance.40 
 
The quantitative findings have been triangulated with interview and workshop findings to 
provide context for the observed changes in the criminal justice metrics.  
 
5.1 Overview of performance of the pilot sites: adult metrics 
An overview of the performance of the pilot sites in relation to the adult metrics and of 
changes in England and Wales and Greater London is provided in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The 
figures presented in these tables represent percentage change in the overall cost of adult 
demand in the CJS (shaded) and for each of the different adult metrics. They compare the 
baseline year (July 2010 to June 2011) to year one and year two of the pilot. The outcome 
target was to reduce the cost of adult demand by more than 5 per cent. 
                                                
40  Data for Greater London covers 32 boroughs (including the five London boroughs where the pilot took place) 
and the City of London. Data for England and Wales includes data for the six pilot sites. 
28 
 Table 5.1: Percentage change in adult demand year one (July 2011 to June 2012) 
compared to the baseline year (July 2010 to June 2011) 
 
Cost of 
demand 
Custodial 
convictions 
< 12 m 
(number) 
Duration of 
custodial 
convictions 
of < 12 m 
(months) 
Community 
orders and 
suspended 
sentence 
orders 
Number of 
probation 
requirements** 
Other convictions: 
non custody and 
non court order 
convictions 
Greater 
Manchester* 
 
-8.4% 
 
8.8% 
 
7.7% 
 
-7.1% 
 
-7.8% 
 
-15.3% 
Croydon  
8.1% 
 
25.7% 
 
30.8% 
 
4.2% 
 
19.6% 
 
0.5% 
Hackney*  
-7.5% 
 
-2.7% 
 
14.9% 
 
-6.0% 
 
-3.5% 
 
-14.6% 
Lambeth  
-4.9% 
 
-1.3% 
 
7.7% 
 
-10.3% 
 
-4.6% 
 
-6.6% 
Lewisham*  
-6.0% 
 
-1.6% 
 
0.3% 
 
-6.8% 
 
2.7% 
 
-9.5% 
Southwark*  
-12.5% 
 
-10.4% 
 
-7.7% 
 
-18.5% 
 
-19.5% 
 
-11.0% 
England and 
Wales 
 
-4.5% 
 
5.2% 
 
5.4% 
 
-5.9% 
 
-5.4% 
 
-7.3% 
Greater 
London 
 
-5.1% 
 
2.2% 
 
4.9% 
 
-7.1% 
 
-5.6% 
 
-6.8% 
Demand is calculated by multiplying the quantity of the different metrics by the agreed price for each metric. 
* Asterisked sites received a payment. 
** Each type of probation requirement was counted as an individual metric (see Table A2.3).  
Source: Level of demand for the pilot sites was derived from MOJ published data (MOJ, 2012a, MOJ, 2012b) 
which include the raw figures. Equivalent unpublished data for the level of demand in England and Wales and 
Greater London was provided by MOJ. 
 
In the first year of the pilot: 
 In the sites where a reward payment was received (asterisked), the reduction in 
the overall cost of demand was greater than that observed in England and Wales 
and Greater London. 
 Five out of the six sites (and England and Wales and Greater London) saw the 
duration of under 12 month custodial convictions increase. 
 In Croydon, which did not meet its target, there was an increase across all the 
metrics. 
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 Table 5.2: Percentage change in adult demand year two (July 2012 to June 2013) 
compared to the baseline year (July 2010 to June 2011) 
 
Cost of 
demand 
Custodial 
convictions 
< 12 m 
(number) 
Duration of 
custodial 
convictions 
of < 12 m 
(months) 
Community 
orders and 
suspended 
sentence 
orders 
Number of 
probation 
requirements 
** 
Other convictions: 
non custody and 
non court order 
convictions 
Greater 
Manchester* 
 
-14.9% 
 
5.2% 
 
6.3% 
 
-19.0% 
 
-20.2% 
 
-19.0% 
Croydon  
-0.9% 
 
1.3% 
 
-0.6% 
 
-3.2% 
 
2.4% 
 
-0.4% 
Hackney*  
-20.1% 
 
-15.8% 
 
-6.9% 
 
-18.8% 
 
-18.4% 
 
-23.3% 
Lambeth*  
-17.7% 
 
-18.1% 
 
-13.6% 
 
-19.1% 
 
-29.3% 
 
-13.9% 
Lewisham*  
-18.1% 
 
-10.9% 
 
-10.3% 
 
-16.7% 
 
-17.4% 
 
-20.8% 
Southwark*  
-26.7% 
 
-30.1% 
 
-32.2% 
 
-30.6% 
 
-32.4% 
 
-21.6% 
England and 
Wales 
 
-10.5% 
 
-0.1% 
 
-1.0% 
 
-13.8% 
 
-15.6% 
 
-10.3% 
Greater 
London 
 
-13.4% 
 
-6.4% 
 
-5.6% 
 
-15.5% 
 
-12.8% 
 
-14.2% 
Demand is calculated by multiplying the quantity of the different metrics by the agreed price for each metric. 
* Asterisked sites received a payment. 
** Each type of probation requirement was counted as an individual metric (see Table A2.3). 
Source: Level of demand for the pilot sites was derived from MOJ published data (MOJ, 2013a, MOJ, 2013d) 
which include the raw figures. Equivalent unpublished data for the level of demand in England and Wales and 
Greater London was provided by MOJ. 
 
In the second year of the pilot: 
 Across all the metrics there were further reductions compared to those observed 
in year one. 
 Although the results in Croydon improved compared to year one, it was not 
enough to reach its target. 
 There was a reduction in ‘other convictions’ in all sites. 
 The four London sites which received a reward payment (asterisked) saw a 
reduction across all the metrics. 
 In Greater Manchester, which met the target, the number and duration of under 
12 month custodial convictions increased. 
 The reductions observed in the sites were set against a backdrop of reductions in 
Greater London and England and Wales.  
 In the sites where a reward payment was received (asterisked), the reduction in 
the overall cost of demand was greater than that observed in England and Wales 
and Greater London. 
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 5.2 Factors affecting the adult metrics 
This section examines factors which may have contributed to the observed performance 
figures for adult demand.  
 
IOM and interventions based on IAC 
IOM and interventions based on the IAC programme were the two principal interventions 
implemented by the sites as part of the pilot. The evaluation literature on these interventions 
indicates that they would most likely have the following effects on the metrics (Senior, et al 
2011; Hansbury, 2011): 
 reduce the conviction count for under 12 month custodial convictions; 
 reduce the number of custody months arising from under 12 month custodial 
convictions;  
 increase the conviction count for community orders and suspended sentence 
orders; and 
 increase the total number of probation requirements.  
 
IOM 
While all sites targeted offenders with under 12 month custodial convictions as part of their 
IOM schemes, in Hackney, Lambeth, Lewisham and Southwark, IOM was the sole or main 
initiative implemented by the site which focused on this cohort. Across these four sites, as 
detailed in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, compared to the baseline, there were: 
 reductions in the number of under 12 month custodial convictions in both years of 
the pilot; 
 increases in the number of custody months (arising from under 12 month 
custodial sentences) in three of these sites in year one, and reductions in all four 
sites in year two; 
 reductions in community orders and suspended sentence orders across all four 
sites in both years; and 
 a reduction in the total number of probation requirements in three sites in year 
one, and a reduction across all four sites in year two.  
 
These findings do not appear to align with the hypothesised outcomes detailed above. The 
findings need to be treated with caution as it has not been possible to compare these results 
with comparator non pilot sites. Also, the proportion of offenders with under 12 month 
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 custodial convictions (as a part of the IOM cohort) varied between the sites,41 as did the 
overall IOM caseloads.  
 
Interventions based on IAC 
As indicated in Table 3.1, Croydon and Greater Manchester established interventions that 
were based on the principles of the IAC programme as part of the pilot. These aimed to offer 
a robust community order to offenders at risk of receiving an under 12 month custodial 
sentence (Clark et al, 2012; Wong et al, 2012) which pre dated the LJR pilot.  
 
In Greater Manchester (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2) compared to the baseline, there were: 
 increases in the number of under 12 month custodial convictions and associated 
custody months in both years of the pilot; and 
 reductions in the number of community orders and suspended sentence orders 
and total probation requirements in both years of the pilot. 
 
In Croydon (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2) compared to the baseline: 
 in year one there were increases across all the categories of metrics;  
 in year two there were increases in the total number of custodial convictions of 
under 12 months, and total probation requirements and reductions in the number 
of custody months for under 12 month custodial convictions, community orders 
and suspended sentence orders, and ‘other convictions’. 
 
The findings suggest that these interventions did not have the expected effect on these 
metrics. 
 
Interviewees in both sites reported they were unable to implement these interventions at 
sufficient scale to affect the metrics, suggesting this was due to limited resources.42 Croydon 
also indicated that this was particularly the case in year one due to the increase in demand 
arising from the August 2011 disturbances.43 Recognising that limited resources were an 
inhibitor, Greater Manchester had allocated a proportion of their year one reward payment to 
scale up the implementation of IAC.44  
                                                
41  The interview data indicated that this varied from approximately 70 per cent in Southwark to a ‘very small’ 
percentage in Hackney. 
42  As indicated in the interim report (Wong et al, 2013) in Greater Manchester IAC type schemes operated in 
only three of the ten local authorities during the pilot.  
43  As noted below in section 5.5, it has not been possible to assess the impact of the disturbances. 
44  This was due to take place after the end of the pilot. 
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 Displacement 
Both IOM and IAC targeted under 12 month custodial convictions. This could result in 
displacement to either community orders or suspended sentence orders (down tariffing), or 
over 12 month custodial convictions (up tariffing).45 Tables 5.1 and 5.2 suggest that there 
was limited down tariffing. No data relating to longer (i.e. 12 months and over) custodial 
sentences was available to the evaluation team in order to robustly assess up tariffing. The 
only evidence of possible up tariffing of under 12 month custodial convictions that may have 
occurred took place in year one; compared to the baseline, there was a slight reduction in the 
number of custodial convictions in Hackney and Lambeth, while their duration increased by 
more than 7 per cent (see Table 5.1). In Greater Manchester, there may have been some 
evidence of up tariffing from community orders and suspended sentence orders (which 
reduced in both project years) to under 12 month custodial convictions (which increased in 
both project years, both in number and duration). However, any conclusions about whether 
up tariffing took place or not would also need to take into account factors such as offence 
seriousness. 
 
Probation requirements 
Probation staff reported that they had been encouraged to be more targeted in their use of 
12 probation requirements46 for community sentences as part of the national sentencing 
proposal initiative which commenced prior to, and continued throughout, the pilot (see 
section 3.4). This typically involved focusing on offender need, making better use of 
sentencing guidelines and proposing robust community orders as an alternative to short term 
custody. Interviewees in Greater Manchester and Southwark identified focusing on 
sentencing proposals (which also included reducing the number and duration of probation 
requirements) as an intervention for the pilot. In the other four sites reducing requirements 
may have taken place as part of wider CJS practice changes, but was not identified as part 
of the pilot. The costs of the requirements varied considerably, from Curfew (electronic 
                                                
45  It should be noted that over 12 month custodial convictions was not an outcome metric. Therefore, there was 
a potential perverse incentive for this to increase during the pilot. As sentencing decisions are generally 
informed by pre sentence reports produced by probation, these reports could have proposed over 12 month 
custodial sentences for offenders (based on offence committed and offence history) on the cusp of either 
receiving an under 12 month custodial sentence or an over 12 month custodial sentence. However, this would 
still have created work for probation as those on over 12 month custodial sentences were also released to 
probation supervision (on licence). In addition, it is sentencers who make the final decisions on sentencing  
46  Probation requirements were counted as individual metrics and included accredited programme; unpaid work; 
drug treatment; supervision; specified activity; mental health; alcohol treatment; residence; curfew; exclusion; 
prohibited activity; and attendance centre. At the time of the LJR pilot there were 12 requirements. However 
since then, there have been amendments to the requirements available. A foreign travel prohibition 
requirement was introduced under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 
2012. A Rehabilitation Activity Requirement was introduced in February 2015 (as part of the Offender 
Rehabilitation Act 2014), which replaced the supervision and activity requirements for offences committed 
after the provision came into force. 
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 monitoring) being the most expensive at £550, to Prohibited Activities, at £150, being one of 
the least expensive (see Table A2.3). The types and numbers of different requirements used, 
therefore, had a different effect on the overall cost of demand.  
 
Across all the sites (except Croydon), Greater London and England and Wales, reductions 
were observed between the baseline year and year two for the following probation 
requirements (see Table A2.3 for more information): 
 accredited programmes; 
 unpaid work; 
 drug treatment;  
 supervision; and  
 curfews. 
 
Accredited Programmes showed a reduction in use in all areas, and these were greater than 
those observed in England and Wales. Where reductions in Drug Treatment and Supervision 
Requirements were observed in the sites, they were generally greater than those observed 
across Greater London, and England and Wales. Specified Activity Requirements showed 
increases in four of the London sites, which probation interviewees in the London sites 
attributed to national policy changes which encouraged probation trusts to reduce the use of 
Accredited Programmes and use the less costly requirement of Specified Activities as an 
alternative (where appropriate in order to meet offenders’ needs). 
 
‘Other convictions’ 
Interviewees across the pilot sites reported that they did not specifically implement 
interventions to reduce ‘other convictions’ (non custody and non court order convictions in 
magistrates’ courts) which included: fines for non payment of fares on public transport, 
summary motoring offences and non payment of council tax.47 These were not a priority for 
the sites and were perceived to be outside the control and influence of local agencies (Wong 
et al, 2013). They did however make an important contribution in enabling the adult demand 
reduction target to be met, and to the size of the adult reward payment. This was due in part 
to a combination of: 
                                                
47  At the commencement of the pilot they also included non payment of TV licences, but these were removed 
during the latter half of year one (Wong et al, 2013). None of the analysis includes data related to the non 
payment of TV licences. 
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  The large reduction in the volume of ‘other convictions’ compared to changes in 
other metrics: For example, the number of ‘other convictions’ in Greater 
Manchester reduced by 8,032 in year one compared to the baseline. Over the 
same period the net change in the combined numbers of custodial convictions for 
under 12 month convictions, related custody months, and community orders and 
suspended sentence orders showed an increase of 508 (MOJ, 2012a).  
 The relatively high price of ‘other convictions’ compared to other outcome 
metrics: The price paid for a reduction in each of the metrics was based on a 
cautious estimate of the potential realisable savings to MOJ, of a fall in the unit 
cost of that metric, over the duration of the pilot. The price paid for a reduction in 
an ‘other conviction’ was £300, which is relatively close to the actual cost of the 
‘other convictions’, indicating that much of the estimated savings were realisable 
within the time frame of the pilot. In contrast, the price paid for a reduction of a 
custody month for an under 12 month custodial sentence was £360 (MOJ, 
2013d). This may appear to be low compared to £2,616, the average monthly 
cost in 2012/13 of a place in a male local prison (where under 12 month 
sentenced prisoners are likely to be held).48 However, this comparatively low 
price indicated that limited savings were realisable within the duration of the pilot. 
 
Analysis of the change in costs of adult demand (see Table A2.6) indicates that if ‘other 
convictions’ had been excluded, only one site (Southwark) would have met the target. 
Analysis of the change in costs for ‘other convictions’ as a percentage of the change in the 
cost of overall adult demand (see Table A2.8) demonstrates that: 
 In five sites, the change in the costs of ‘other convictions’ contributed over 40 per 
cent of the total reduction in costs in both years.  
 In Croydon, the contribution of ‘other convictions’ was generally considerably 
smaller in both years compared to the other sites. 
 
                                                
48  The average annual cost of a prison place in a male local prison in 2012/13 was £31,398 (MOJ, 2013b). 
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 5.3 Overview of the performance of the sites: youth metrics 
An overview of the performance of the pilot sites in relation to the youth metrics, and of 
changes in England and Wales and Greater London, is provided in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. The 
figures presented in these tables represent percentage change in the overall cost of demand 
(shaded) and for each of the different metrics. They compare the baseline year (July 2010 to 
June 2011) to year one and year two of the pilot. The outcome target was to reduce the cost 
of youth demand by more than 10 per cent. 
 
Table 5.3: Percentage change in youth demand year one (July 2011 to June 2012) 
compared to the baseline year (July 2010 to June 2011) 
 
Cost of 
demand 
Custodial 
convictions of 
less than two 
years (number) 
Duration of custodial 
convictions of less 
than two years 
(months) 
Community 
order 
convictions 
Other convictions: 
non custody and 
non court order 
convictions 
Greater 
Manchester* 
 
-21.1% 
 
-17.5% 
 
-16.4% 
 
-22.3% 
 
-35.1% 
Croydon  
6.7% 
**  
49.3% 
 
-21.9% 
 
0.0% 
Hackney Not involved in the youth element of the pilot 
Lambeth  
13.4% 
**  
42.8% 
 
-14.6% 
 
-3.1% 
Lewisham*  
-20.0% 
**  
-16.3% 
 
-20.8% 
 
-31.7% 
Southwark*  
-29.2% 
**  
-41.5% 
 
-14.0% 
 
-15.5% 
England and 
Wales 
 
-13.0% 
 
-5.4% 
 
-2.9% 
 
-17.5% 
 
-25.4% 
Greater 
London 
 
0.1% 
 
9.2% 
 
17.3% 
 
-8.5% 
 
-23.9% 
Demand is calculated by multiplying the quantity of the different metrics by the agreed price for each metric. 
* Asterisked sites received a payment. 
Source: Level of demand for the pilot sites was derived from MOJ published data (MOJ, 2012a, MOJ, 2012b) 
which includes the raw figures. Equivalent unpublished data for the level of demand in England and Wales and 
Greater London was provided by MOJ. 
** The calculations for these cells use figures for the baseline year and/or the project year of less than 50. Small 
changes in these figures can produce large percentage changes: in these cases, the percentage change is 
not reported. 
 
In the first year of the pilot: 
 The three sites which received a reward payment at the end of year one 
(asterisked) and England and Wales had a reduction in all metrics. 
 The two sites which did not reach their targets saw a large increase in the 
duration of custodial convictions of less than two years. 
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 Table 5.4: Percentage change in youth demand year two (July 2012 to June 2013) 
compared to the baseline year (July 2010 to June 2011) 
 
Cost of 
demand 
Custodial 
convictions of 
less than two 
years (number)
Duration of custodial 
convictions of less 
than two years 
(months) 
Community 
order 
convictions 
Other convictions: 
non custody and 
non court order 
convictions 
Greater 
Manchester* 
 
-42.1% 
 
-38.4% 
 
-35.0% 
 
-45.1% 
 
-59.2% 
Croydon  
6.7% 
**  
76.5% 
 
-31.1% 
 
-28.6% 
Hackney Not involved in the youth element of the pilot 
Lambeth*  
-45.9% 
**  
-56.3% 
 
-42.7% 
 
-12.4% 
Lewisham*  
-53.1% 
**  
-58.3% 
 
-50.7% 
 
-35.9% 
Southwark*  
-50.0% 
**  
-57.9% 
 
-43.3% 
 
-28.9% 
England and 
Wales 
 
-36.8% 
 
-32.6% 
 
-30.7% 
 
-40.7% 
 
-45.1% 
Greater 
London 
 
-28.3% 
 
-21.6% 
 
-16.2% 
 
-36.3% 
 
-39.7% 
Demand is calculated by multiplying the quantity of the different metrics by the agreed price for each metric. 
* Asterisked sites received a payment. 
Source: Level of demand for the pilot sites was derived from MOJ published data (MOJ, 2013a, MOJ, 2013d) 
which includes the raw figures. Equivalent unpublished data for the level of demand in England and Wales and 
Greater London was provided by MOJ. 
** The calculations for these cells use figures for the baseline year and/or the project year of less than 50. Small 
changes in these figures can produce large percentage changes: in these cases, the percentage change is 
not reported. 
 
In the second year of the pilot: 
 Across the four sites which received a reward payment at the end of year two, 
there were further reductions on all metrics compared to those achieved in year 
one. 
 The reductions observed in the sites were set against a backdrop of reductions in 
Greater London and England and Wales.  
 Where a reward payment was received, the reduction in the overall cost of 
demand at these sites was greater than that observed in England and Wales and 
Greater London. 
 Croydon, which did not meet its target in year one or year two, saw a large 
increase in the duration of custodial sentences of less than two years. 
 
5.4 Factors affecting the youth metrics 
As indicated in section 3.2, the sites implemented limited practice changes in response to the 
youth metrics. Therefore the changes in youth metrics are likely to have arisen as a result of 
other factors. However, it was not clear what the drivers of this change were. 
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 Analysis of the change in costs of youth demand (see Table A2.7) indicates that the inclusion 
of the costs of ‘other convictions’ did not result in any sites achieving their target, as those 
sites that exceeded the 10 per cent target did so without including these convictions; nor did 
it substantially affect the size of the reward payment. 
 
5.5 Wider external factors 
Other criminal justice outcomes 
While the pilot sites may have aimed to reduce demand on the CJS through the interventions 
that they implemented, initiatives outside the pilot may also have affected these outcomes, 
as well as overall crime levels and the reporting behaviour of victims. The broader aims of 
this pilot were to reduce crime and reoffending, based on an assumption that reducing 
demand (through the pilot metrics) would have some influence on these broader CJS 
outcomes – indicated in section 2.1. In this section, changes in recorded crime, reoffending 
and numbers of first time entrants across England and Wales are examined to provide 
context for the performance of the sites during the pilot.  
 
During the period of the pilot, the following trends were observed: 
 All sites, England and Wales and Greater London, saw a reduction in police 
recorded crime between the baseline year and year two, with slight fluctuations in 
year one in some sites (see ONS, 2013 and Table A2.9).  
 Most sites, England and Wales and Greater London, saw a reduction in three 
month adult reoffending rates49 between the baseline year and year two, with 
fluctuation in some sites in year one (see MOJ, 2011a; MOJ, 2012c; MOJ, 2013e 
and Table A2.10).50  
 There was a reduction in adult and young offender first time entrants into the CJS 
in England and Wales between the baseline year and year two (see MOJ, 2013c 
and Table A2.11). 
 
Considering these three outcomes together, they would suggest that the throughput into the 
wider CJS reduced over the pilot years. This cannot be seen as an effect of the pilot, but 
provides an indication of the context within which the pilots were operating.  
 
                                                
49  Which covers all offences occurring in the area, including those which would not be covered by the outcome 
metrics. 
50  There may be a substantial time lag between interventions and their impact on reconviction rates therefore 
changes to reconviction rates during the pilot may have been due to interventions which commenced prior to 
the pilot. 
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 The effect of deadweight on the cost of demand 
Deadweight is defined as what would have occurred anyway, without the pilot. The 
reductions in the cost of demand in England and Wales and Greater London during the two 
years of the pilot suggest that reductions at the sites may have been partly due to wider 
reductions in demand on the CJS, i.e. deadweight. 
 For adult demand, the 5 per cent reduction target for the pilot was exceeded in 
Greater London in year one, and in England and Wales and Greater London in 
year two (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). 
 For youth demand, the 10 per cent reduction target for the pilot was exceeded in 
England and Wales in year one, and in England and Wales and Greater London 
in year two (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). 
 
While the reductions in the sites which achieved the target were greater than in Greater 
London and England and Wales (see Tables 5.1 to 5.4), it has not been possible to account 
for this. 
 
The issue of deadweight was acknowledged by some interviewees involved in delivering the 
pilot in the London sites. They suggested that the initiatives they had implemented were 
unlikely to have impacted substantially upon the demand reduction target during the pilot.  
 
Setting the cost of demand reduction targets at more than 5 per cent for adults and 10 per 
cent for young people was intended to account for deadweight, while enabling the targets to 
be achievable.51 However, the results suggest that setting the targets at these levels may 
have been insufficient for this pilot to ensure deadweight prevention. 
 
Unlike the Youth Justice Custody Reinvestment Pathfinder, where demand reduction targets 
(based on reducing custody bed nights) were individualised to each of the Pathfinder sites 
(ranging from 12 to 20 per cent),52 the LJR pilot target was based on the same target for 
each site. The target may have been more challenging for some sites and less challenging 
for others, allowing a differential level of deadweight prevention between the LJR pilot sites. 
 
                                                
51  The targets were set based on the average standard deviation in overall net cost across all the sites in the 
three years prior to the pilot. 
52  Further details can be found in Wong et al, 2015. 
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 The August 2011 disturbances 
As detailed in the interim report, interviewees in some of the sites, and data from MOJ, 
indicated that the disturbances in August 201153 may have impacted on the cost of demand. 
Interviewees across all the London sites reported that they were affected by the 
disturbances. The analysis of the cost of demand excluding ‘other convictions’54 shows that, 
compared to the baseline, in year one (July 2011 to June 2012):  
 Croydon and Hackney saw an increase in the cost of adult demand excluding 
‘other convictions’, while the other three London sites saw a reduction 
(see Table A2.4); and 
 Croydon and Lambeth saw an increase in the cost of youth demand excluding 
‘other convictions’, while Lewisham and Southwark saw a reduction55 
(see Table A2.5). 
 
Disturbances also took place in two56 of the ten local authority areas in Greater Manchester. 
However, interviewees and workshop participants suggested that this had a limited impact, 
due to any increase in demand being absorbed across the county (Wong et al, 2013). This 
appears to be confirmed by the data which show reductions in the cost of adult and youth 
demand excluding ‘other convictions’ in both years of the pilot (see Tables A2.4 and A2.5). 
 
Overall, it has not been possible to assess the impact of the disturbances on the cost of 
demand. 
 
                                                
53 In August 2011, thousands of people caused disturbances and looting, in several London boroughs and in 
cities (including Manchester and Salford) and towns across England, after a protest in Tottenham (London) 
about the police shooting of a local man. 3,103 people were brought before the courts by 10 August 2012 for 
offences related to the August 2011 public disorder. MOJ (2012d) compared sentencing outcomes in England 
and Wales following the disturbances, between 6 and 9 August 2011, with similar offences committed in 
England and Wales in 2010. The study found that the duration of custodial sentences doubled (from 2.1 to 
4.3 months) for adults, with a smaller increase for youths (from 7.3 to 8.0 months). 
54 ‘Other convictions’ were excluded as these offences were unlikely to have been affected by the disturbances. 
55 The third site, Hackney, was not involved in the youth element of the pilot 
56 Manchester and Salford. 
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 5.6 Summary 
The overall cost of both adult and youth demand reduced in the majority of sites in both 
years of the pilot. Reductions observed in England and Wales and Greater London suggest 
that the reductions at the sites may have been partly due to wider reductions in demand on 
the CJS, i.e. deadweight. While the sites’ reductions were greater than in England and Wales 
and Greater London, this process evaluation was not set up, and therefore not able to 
explain these differences.  
 
In the sites that met the demand reduction targets, there was a reduction in the majority of 
the outcome metrics. Reductions in ‘other convictions’, a metric which was not targeted for 
interventions by any of the sites, made a large contribution to reducing the cost of adult 
demand in the majority of sites. In relation to the other metrics, it has been not possible to 
identify the effect of IOM or IAC, the main interventions implemented by the sites. The 
changes in the metrics that were observed at the sites did not align with the outcomes 
hypothesised for these interventions.  
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 6. Conclusions and implications for policy 
The LJR pilot was commissioned as an exploratory project to test out new approaches to 
criminal justice through PbR commissioning, and the research has provided important 
learning to inform the government’s TR reforms. This chapter draws together the key lessons 
learned from all phases of the evaluation and identifies implications for policy. 
 
6.1 Design of the outcome measure and metric  
The experience of the pilot suggests that it is difficult to design an outcome measure that is 
sufficiently challenging and provides adequate deadweight prevention. Basing an outcome 
measure on a wide range of metrics with different prices appeared to have added a 
perceived complexity to devising interventions to address them, particularly where reducing 
demand on one metric could increase demand on another (albeit at a lower cost) 
e.g. Accredited Programmes and Specified Activities.  
 
In addition, the relatively high price paid for reducing a high volume metric such as ‘other 
convictions’ compared to the relatively low price paid for reducing the lower volume custody 
months (a reflection of the relative cashability of these outcomes within the duration of the 
pilot) may have affected the credibility of the outcome measure for the sites. ‘Other 
convictions’ made a large contribution to most of the sites achieving their adult demand 
target, despite this metric not being targeted for interventions by any of the sites as the 
offences related to the metric were not regarded as a priority. In relation to other metrics, it 
was not possible to assess what action taken by the sites contributed to their performance, in 
part because of the lack of local management information collected by the sites which linked 
their activity to the metrics.  
 
The research has identified the following implications, which may be helpful in designing 
future initiatives. To: 
 Design outcome measures which:  
 can be directly linked to actions undertaken by delivery agencies to aid 
implementation and evaluation;  
 are easy to understand and can be monitored using local data;  
 are aligned to local priorities; and 
 have the buy in of a wide range of stakeholders. 
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  Ensure that the volume and the importance of the metric in relation to the 
priorities of providers are taken into account, along with cashability when setting 
the price for different outcome metrics. 
 Require local agencies to articulate how their activities link to outcomes and to 
collect management information to monitor this so that initiatives can be 
comprehensively evaluated.  
 Minimise the likelihood of ‘deadweight’ by designing an outcome measure that is 
individualised to an area based on past criminal justice trends.  
 Have in place clear agreements between commissioners and providers on what 
constitutes exceptional external circumstances (such as the August 2011 
disturbances) and consider adjusting the performance metrics accordingly. 
 
6.2 Design of the incentives 
Stakeholders across all the sites felt that the pilot provided only limited incentive to 
encourage local areas to invest in and/or make substantial changes to their services.  
 
The research has identified these possible lessons for future initiatives: 
 Provide some upfront funding to local agencies to help facilitate change and 
reinforce incentives offered by the reward payments. 
 Consider a potential reward payment in combination with a penalty mechanism 
which is substantial enough to incentivise providers to focus their delivery on 
better outcomes. 
 
6.3 Partnership working and the role of individual agencies 
The buy in from the core partners (the police, probation, local authorities and YOTs) was 
important to the effective implementation of this initiative. However, probation had the most 
central role because they were the agency that could most significantly influence the adult 
metrics by improving existing practice.57 Similarly, while there appeared to be limited YOT 
involvement in the implementation of this pilot, they were the agency that could most 
significantly influence the youth metrics by improving existing practice, as suggested by the 
findings from the Youth Justice Custody Reinvestment Pathfinder (Wong et al, 2015). 
 
                                                
57  Although it should be noted that sentencers made the final decisions e.g. on what requirements should be 
included in an order, taking into account proposals put forward by probation staff. 
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 The research has identified these possible lessons for future initiatives: 
 Individual agencies should be encouraged to deliver more effective services by 
systematically reviewing their processes and operational practices and ensuring 
that staff implement the changes. 
 Commitment is required from the core agencies of police, probation, local 
authorities and YOTs.  
 Partnership working should not be regarded as a panacea for delivering more 
effective criminal justice outcomes. Individual agencies also need to focus on 
improving their own practices and processes. 
 
6.4 Data analysis and performance management 
The pilot has demonstrated that there may be variable (and in some cases limited) 
motivation to invest in data analysis capability to inform delivery and facilitate performance 
management. In part this was due to the limited availability of nationally held data and the 
time lag in providing this data. Greater Manchester adopted and continued to refine 
performance management as a strategic and operational imperative, while other sites 
undertook limited or no such activity. There was limited evidence that receipt (or non receipt) 
of a reward payment had any impact on sites’ motivation to undertake such analysis, 
monitoring and management. Whilst the project was set up so that the sites could have 
autonomy over implementation locally, there was a perception by the sites that they were not 
fully held to account by MOJ/NOMS for the implementation of the pilot or performance. 
 
The research has identified these possible lessons for future initiatives: 
 Ensure that there is sufficient capacity and capability to provide management 
data to local agencies. 
 Specify that local agencies undertake a minimum level of performance 
management and data analysis to ensure effective implementation. 
 Specify a level of regular reporting that holds local agencies to account for 
delivery and performance and which can also be used for evaluation. 
 Ensure that there are sufficient incentives/penalties to encourage local agencies 
to invest in resourcing a data analysis capability. 
 Support local agencies to develop their capability to analyse and use local and 
national data to effectively inform local implementation and cost effective 
commissioning of services. 
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  Local agencies need to invest (individually or as a group of agencies) in their 
capacity and capability to analyse data to inform the design and implementation 
of local services.  
 
6.5 Evidence base 
A key barrier identified through the evaluation was the limited availability locally of robust 
evidence to support reliable investment appraisals of the costs and benefits of interventions. 
Developing such evidence was seen as being particularly important to ensure sustainability 
in response to changes in policy and new commissioning arrangements, such as TR.  
 
This has the following implications which may be helpful in implementing future initiatives: 
 Commissioners could support the development of a database/repository of robust 
evidence to inform the delivery of cost effective justice interventions.  
 Local commissioning frameworks should require that the most robust evidence is 
available to support funding decisions. 
 Local agencies implementing justice services should consider: 
 Using the best research evidence available, and where this is absent 
undertake robust evaluation of their interventions; and 
 Adopting a portfolio approach to commissioning/implementing interventions 
that allows for risk to be shared between interventions which are proven to 
be effective, and promising interventions with limited evidence of impact.  
 
6.6 Scale 
The experience of the pilot suggests that there are advantages to implementing a PbR pilot 
across a large geographical area such as Greater Manchester, which included: 
 economies of scale in establishing resettlement support and engaging with courts, 
sentencers and prisons; 
 sharing risk to mitigate the effects of unexpected events such as the August 2011 
disturbances; and 
 being able to resource data analysis capacity and capability to inform the design 
of interventions and monitor performance. 
 
The implication of this for the design of future incentive based initiatives is that consideration 
should be given to implementing them over a large geographical area. 
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 6.7 Timescales for implementation and assessing change 
The pilot has demonstrated that providers need time to adjust to new commissioning 
processes such as PbR.  
 
Providing no time restrictions on spending the reward payment appeared to allow for better 
and more considered decisions about how to spend it. Conversely, without time restrictions it 
can be difficult to assess the impact of the reward payment.  
 
In designing future initiatives, the following may need to be considered: 
 Contractors and commissioners need to allow sufficient time for procurement, 
bedding in of contracts, and building of capacity/understanding. 
 Some limits could be placed on the timescales for spending reward payments, 
allowing adequate time for considered assessment and evaluation of options.  
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 Appendix 1 
Methodology 
The research was mainly qualitative. Fieldwork was conducted in three phases: 
 Phase one – between November 2011 and February 2012. 
 Phase two – between July and November 2012. 
 Phase three – between September and December 2013. 
 
Details of the number of participants, research activities, how the qualitative data was 
analysed and the limitations of the methodology, are reported below.  
 
Research participants were purposively sampled, based on their knowledge of and/or 
involvement in implementing the pilot. Interview schedules, workshop and focus group topic 
guides were used. 
 
A1.1 Phase one 
Research activities were undertaken across six sites, and are summarised in Table A1.1. 
 
Table A1.1: Phase one research activities across the sites, and numbers of 
participants 
Research activity M
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Total 
Interviews with strategic 
and operational managers 
(public, private and 
Voluntary and Community 
Sector agencies) 
7 19 6 2 4 5 4 7 54 
Focus group with VCS 
agencies  
- 9 - - - - - - 9 
Modelling workshop - 10 7 (across the London sites, and London wide agencies) 17 
Validation workshop - 6 7 (across the London sites, and London wide agencies) 13 
Document review Documents reviewed across all sites 
 
A1.2 Phase two 
Research activities were undertaken across all six sites. In addition, three case study sites 
(Greater Manchester, Croydon and Lewisham) were selected based on: the delivery model; 
access to quantitative data; and links to complementary initiatives. Additional activities were 
undertaken at these sites. These included: interviews with front line staff from police, 
probation and VCS agencies; interviews with sentencers and court staff; interviews with 
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 prisons; and workshops which explored, in depth, the implementation and costs of an 
exemplar intervention selected by the case study site. The activities undertaken in phase two 
are summarised in Table A1.2. 
 
Table A1.2: Phase two research activities across the sites, and number of participants 
Research activity M
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Total 
Interviews with strategic 
and operational managers 
(public, private and 
Voluntary and Community 
Sector agencies) and front 
line staff (police, probation 
and VCS) 
6 44 12 2 7 8 6 5 90 
Mapping workshop - 7 7 - 7 5 6 - 32 
Validation workshop - 10 12 (across the London sites, and London wide agencies) 22 
Exemplar intervention 
workshop 
- 9 3 - - 7 - - 19 
Document review Documents reviewed across all sites 
 
A1.3 Phase three 
Research activities were undertaken across all six sites. These are summarised in Table 
A1.3. During phase three, the evaluation team analysed data provided by MOJ and drawn 
from published government sources on: the outcome measure, the outcome metrics and 
other related criminal justice data, including recorded crime and reoffending rates. The team 
produced a report which examined trends before and during the pilot for the sites, Greater 
London and England and Wales. The resulting analysis was approved by MOJ prior to being 
sent to the key individuals at the sites for their consideration. Following this, a data workshop 
and interviews were undertaken to validate the quantitative findings and to understand the 
local factors which may have influenced the performance of the sites.   
 
Table A1.3: Phase three research activities across the sites and number of 
participants 
Research activity M
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Total 
Interviews with strategic and 
operational managers (public, 
private and Voluntary and 
Community Sector agencies) and 
data interviews  
2 18 5 4 4 7 5 4 49 
Data workshop - 4 - - - - - - 4 
Document review Documents reviewed across all sites 
Analysis of criminal justice data Based on data for the sites, Greater London and England and Wales 
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 A1.4 Analysis of qualitative data 
Interview data was transcribed (where consent was given), coded and analysed thematically 
(based on the research questions) using NVivo software.  
 
A1.5 Limitations of the methodology 
The purposive sampling of interview, focus group and workshop participants aimed to reflect 
the range of agencies involved in implementing and supporting the implementation of the 
LJR pilots.  
 
As with all qualitative research, the data gathered was dependent on the availability and the 
willingness of individuals to participate. Therefore, those who participated may have been 
more positive or negative about the experience of the pilot.  
 
Details of the analysis of the demand metrics and other criminal justice data are contained in 
Appendix 2. 
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 Appendix 2 
Analysis of quantitative data 
The data for the cost of demand and outcome metrics was provided by the MOJ. Other data 
was obtained from published government sources, as indicated in the sections below. 
 
The sources of the raw data for the pilot outcome metrics were: 
 the number and duration of custodial convictions came from the Police National 
Computer (PNC); 
 the number of Community Orders and Suspended Sentence Orders also came 
from the PNC; 
 Probation requirements data came from the probation trusts and commercial 
providers; and 
 data on ‘other convictions’ came from Magistrates HOCAS and LIBRA systems. 
 
The data covers the following periods:  
 The baseline year (July 2010 to June 2011); 
 Year one of the pilot (July 2011 to June 2012); and 
 Year two (July 2012 to June 2013). 
 
Data relating to England and Wales and the whole of Greater London58 were included in the 
analysis to enable a high level analysis of the performance of the sites to be undertaken.  
 
A2.1 Cost of demand 
Table A2.1 sets out the change in the cost of adult and youth demand for years one and two 
of the pilot compared to the baseline for the six pilot sites, Greater London and England and 
Wales.  
 
                                                
58  Data for England and Wales includes the data for the six pilot sites. Greater London covers 32 boroughs 
(including the five London boroughs where the pilot took place) and the City of London. 
54 
 Table A2.1: Percentage change in the cost of criminal justice demand across the pilot 
sites, Greater London and England and Wales in year one and year two, compared to 
baseline year 
 Year one (July 2011 to June 2012) Year two (July 2012 to June 2013) 
 
Change in cost 
of demand 
(adult) % 
Change in cost 
of demand 
(youth) %
Payment 
due
(000)
Change in cost 
of demand 
(adult) %
Change in cost 
of demand 
(youth) % 
Payment 
due
(000)
Greater Manchester -8.4 -21.1 £2,670 -14.9 -42.1 £4,986
Croydon 8.1 6.7 £0 -0.9 6.7 £0
Hackney -7.5 N/A £189 -20.1 N/A £659
Lambeth -4.9 13.4 £0 -17.7 -45.9 £737
Lewisham -6 -20.0 £249 -18.1 -53.1 £792
Southwark -12.5 -29.2 £514 -26.7 -50.0 £844
Greater London -5.1 0.1 N/A -13.4 -28.3 N/A
England and Wales -4.5 -13.0 N/A -10.5 -36.8 N/A
Source: MOJ, 2012b and 2013d 
 
A2.2 Probation requirements 
Table A2.2 presents the percentage change in the total number of probation requirements 
given, and the associated costs, comparing years one and two to the baseline. These 
requirements were those specific requirements linked to Community Orders and Suspended 
Sentence Orders, and encompassed the following: accredited programmes; unpaid work; 
drug treatment; supervision; specified activities; mental health programmes; alcohol 
treatment; residence conditions; exclusion orders; prohibited activities; attendance centre 
requirements; and curfews.59 
 
Table A2.2: Percentage change in the total number and costs of probation 
requirements in years one and two, compared to the baseline 
 
Greater 
Manchester* Croydon Hackney* Lambeth** Lewisham* Southwark* 
Greater 
London 
England 
and 
Wales
Total number of 
requirements year 1 
-7.8 19.6% -3.5% -4.6% 2.7% -19.5% -5.6% -5.4%
Total cost of 
requirements year 1 
-8.7% 16.7% -6.8% -8.4% -0.3% -20.1% -8.1% -6.4%
Total number of 
requirements year 2 
-20.2% 2.4% -18.4% -29.3% -17.4% -32.4% -12.8% -15.6%
Total cost of 
requirements year 2 
-20.8% -1.9% -24.0% -32.8% -19.6% -32.8% -17.4% -17.6%
* Received a reward payment both pilot years. 
** Received a reward payment in year two only. 
Source: Site figures are derived from MOJ published data (MOJ, 2012a, 2012b, and 2013a). Figures for Greater 
London and England and Wales are calculated from data provided by MOJ. 
 
                                                
59  At the time of the LJR pilot there were 12 requirements. However since then, there have been amendments to 
the requirements available. A foreign travel prohibition requirement was introduced under the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012. A Rehabilitation Activity Requirement was 
introduced in February 2015 (as part of the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014), which replaced the supervision 
and activity requirements for offences committed after the provision came into force. 
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 Table A2.3 presents the percentage change in the number of individual requirements 
comparing the baseline year to year two. 
 
Table A2.3: Percentage change in use of probation requirements attached to 
community orders and suspended sentence orders, between baseline year and year 
two 
 
Greater 
Manchester Croydon Hackney Lambeth Lewisham Southwark 
Greater 
London 
England 
and 
Wales 
Accredited 
programme (£430) 
 
-54.6% 
 
-37.8% 
 
-63.3% 
 
-63.6% 
 
-48.6% 
 
-55.6% 
 
-50.1% 
 
-31.1% 
Unpaid work (£290)  
-16.1% 
 
-4.8% 
 
-21.1% 
 
-30.8% 
 
-27.4% 
 
-33.5% 
 
-12.7% 
 
-20.5% 
Drug treatment 
(£270) 
 
-20.0% 
 
6.1% 
 
-35.9% 
 
-33.1% 
 
-13.9% 
 
-40.0% 
 
-9.0% 
 
-8.2% 
Supervision (£270)  
-24.5% 
 
14.0% 
 
-13.9% 
 
-30.6% 
 
-9.5% 
 
-24.0% 
 
-6.3% 
 
-13.8% 
Specified activity 
(£230) 
 
-10.0% 
 
66.4% 
 
76.4% 
 
30.7% 
 
18.3% 
 
-2.7% 
 
44.9% 
 
25.3% 
Curfew (EM 
tagging) (£550) 
 
-9.5% 
 
-9.7% 
 
-36.8% 
 
-38.3% 
 
-18.1% 
 
-32.3% 
 
-33.0% 
 
-22.2% 
Source: Figures are derived from MOJ published data (MOJ, 2012a, 2012b and 2013a) and unpublished data 
provided by MOJ. 
Other requirements included mental health (£220); residential (£150); exclusion (£150); prohibited activity (£150), 
alcohol treatment (£170) and attendance centre (£190). The percentage changes for these requirements have not 
been included as the actual numbers were too small. 
 
A2.3 ‘Other convictions’ 
Tables A2.4 to A2.8 detail the contribution of ‘other convictions’ to the demand totals in both 
the adult and youth justice system:  
 Table A2.4 sets out the adult demand costs excluding ‘other convictions’ costs for 
both years of the pilot compared to the baseline.  
 Table A2.5 presents the same analysis in relation to the youth justice system.  
 Tables A2.6 and A2.7 address the changes in total demand costs for adults and 
youth resulting from the inclusion of the ‘other convictions’.  
 Table A2.8 shows ‘other convictions’ in year one and year two, as a percentage 
of changes in the cost of overall adult demand. 
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 Table A2.4: Annual costs of adult demand excluding ‘other convictions’ for the pilot 
sites, Greater London and England and Wales in the baseline year, year one and year 
two 
 
July ’10 to June ’11 
(Baseline)
£
July ’11 to June ’12 
(Pilot year 1)
£
July ’12 to June ’13 
(Pilot year 2)
£
Greater Manchester 19,632,280 19,070,370 17,351,100
Croydon 1,886,970 2,237,790 1,858,190
Hackney 1,729,900 1,744,980 1,448,050
Lambeth 2,088,680 2,026,860 1,633,280
Lewisham 2,039,680 2,003,200 1,735,170
Southwark 2,209,470 1,897,700 1,507,470
Greater London 48,776,950 47,241,380 42,678,950
England and Wales 284,197,280 278,296,530 253,907,090
Source: Figures relating to the project sites are derived from MOJ published data (MOJ, 2012a, 2013a and 
2012b). Equivalent unpublished data for the level of demand in England and Wales and Greater London was 
provided by MOJ.  
Demand is calculated by multiplying the quantity of the different metrics (taken from MOJ, 2012a, MOJ, 2013a) by 
the agreed prices used in the LJR pilots (taken from MOJ, 2012b). The prices paid for reducing demand were 
based on cautious estimates of the realisable savings to MOJ.  
 
Table A2.5: Annual costs of youth demand excluding ‘other convictions’ for the pilot 
sites, Greater London and England and Wales in the baseline year, year one and year 
two 
 
July ’10 – June ’11
(Baseline)
£
July ’11 – June ’12
(Pilot year 1)
£
July ’12 – June ’13
(Pilot year 2)
£
Greater Manchester 3,395,660 2,750,350 2,052,220
Croydon 468,940 505,820 530,160
Hackney Hackney did not participate in the youth element of the pilot 
Lambeth 460,640 529,830 233,680
Lewisham 553,410 450,990 248,120
Southwark 424,810 294,490 202,360
Greater London 8,432,390 8,797,560 6,216,240
England and Wales 44,868,950 40,211,100 28,795,120
Source: Figures relating to the project sites are derived from MOJ published data (MOJ, 2012a, 2013a and 
2012b). Equivalent unpublished data for the level of demand in England and Wales and Greater London was 
provided by MOJ. 
Demand is calculated by multiplying the quantity of the different metrics (taken from MOJ, 2012a, MOJ, 2013a) by 
the agreed prices used in the LJR pilots (taken from MOJ, 2012b).  
 
Table A2.6: Percentage changes in adult demand costs including and excluding ‘other 
convictions’ for year one and year two of the pilot, compared to the baseline 
 Year one (July 2011 to June 2012 Year two (July 2012 to June 2013) 
 
Excluding ‘other 
convictions’ 
%
Including ‘other 
convictions’ 
%
Excluding ‘other 
convictions’  
% 
Including ‘other 
convictions’ 
%
Greater Manchester -2.9 -8.4 -11.6 -14.9
Croydon 18.6 8.1 -1.5 -0.9
Hackney 0.9 -7.5 -16.3 -20.1
Lambeth -3.0 -4.9 -21.8 -17.7
Lewisham -1.8 -6 -14.9 -18.1
Southwark -14.1 -12.5 -31.8 -26.7
Greater London -3.1 -5.1 -12.5 -13.4
England and Wales -2.1 -4.5 -10.7 -10.5
Source: Figures are derived from MOJ published data (MOJ, 2012a, 2013a and 2012b). 
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 Table A2.7: Percentage changes in youth demand costs including and excluding 
‘other convictions’ for year one and year two of the pilot, compared to the baseline  
 Year one (July 2011 to June 2012 Year two (July 2012 to June 2013) 
 
Excluding ‘other 
convictions’ 
%
Including ‘other 
convictions’ 
%
Excluding ‘other 
convictions’  
% 
Including ‘other 
convictions’ 
%
Greater Manchester -19.0 -21.1 -39.6 -42.1
Croydon 7.9 6.7 13.0 6.7
Hackney Hackney did not participate in the youth element of the pilot 
Lambeth 15.0 13.4 -49.3 -45.9
Lewisham -18.5 -20.0 -55.2 -53.1
Southwark -30.7 -29.2 -52.4 -50.0
Greater London 4.3 0.1 -26.3 -28.3
England and Wales -10.4 -13.0 -35.8 -36.8
Source: Figures are derived from MOJ published data (MOJ, 2012a, 2013a and 2012b). 
 
Table A2.8: Change in costs for all ‘other convictions’ in year one and year two, as a 
percentage of changes in the cost of overall adult demand, compared to the baseline 
year 
  
Change in costs 
of all the metrics 
excluding ‘other 
convictions’ 
Change in 
costs for ‘other 
convictions’ (£)
Change in 
cost of 
overall 
demand (£) 
Percentage of overall 
demand change 
accounted for by 
‘other convictions’
Year 1 -561,910 -2,409,600 -2,971,510 81.1%Greater Manchester 
Year 2 -2,281,180 -3,006,300 -5,287,480 56.9%
Year 1 350,820 12,300 363,120 3.4%Croydon 
Year 2 -28,780 -11,100 -39,880 27.8%
Year 1 15,080 -298,200 -283,120 105.3%Hackney 
Year 2 -281,850 -475,500 -757,350 62.8%
Year 1 -61,820 -149,400 -211,220 70.7%Lambeth 
Year 2 -455,400 -314,100 -769,500 40.8%
Year 1 -36,480 -231,900 -268,380 86.4%Lewisham 
Year 2 -304,510 -506,700 -811,210 62.5%
Year 1 -311,770 -242,400 -554,170 43.7%Southwark 
Year 2 -702,000 -477,300 -1,179,300 40.5%
Year 1 -1,535,570 -3,742,800 -5,278,370 70.9%Greater London 
Year 2 -6,098,000 -7,805,100 -13,903,100 56.1%
Year 1 -5,900,750 -18,643,500 -24,544,250 76.0%England and Wales 
Year 2 -30,290,190 -26,330,100 -56,620,290 46.5%
Source: Figures are derived from MOJ published data (MOJ, 2012a, 2013a and 2012b). 
 
A2.4 Recorded crime 
The recorded crime figures have been obtained from data published by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS, 2013). 
 
Table A2.9 sets out the annual police recorded crime for the pilot sites, Greater London and 
England and Wales for the baseline and both years of the pilot.  
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 Table A2.9: Annual police recorded crimes in the pilot sites (number and percentage 
change from baseline), Greater London and England and Wales. Baseline year, year 
one and year two. 
 
July 10 to June 11
Baseline
July 11 to Jun 12 
Year 1 
July 12 to June 13 
Year 2 
 Number Number
% change from 
baseline Number 
% change from 
baseline
Greater Manchester  220,508 199,520 -9.5% 178,195 -19.2%
Croydon  32,297 32,593 0.9% 29,893 -7.4%
Hackney  27,870 28,020 0.5% 27,020 -3.0%
Lambeth  36,148 36,340 0.5% 33,926 -6.1%
Lewisham  28,218 26,442 -6.3% 23,869 -15.4%
Southwark  35,790 33,587 -6.2% 32,188 -10.1%
Greater London 819,332 798,354 -2.6% 741,938 -9.4%
England and Wales 4,035,847 3,801,259 -5.8% 3,514,968 -12.9%
Source: Figures are derived from ONS, 2013. 
 
A2.5 Adult reoffending rates 
Table A2.10 sets out the three month adult reoffending rates for the pilot sites, Greater 
London and England and Wales for the baseline and both years of the pilot. These have 
been drawn from data published by MOJ (MOJ, 2011a; MOJ, 2012c; MOJ, 2013e). 
 
Table A2.10: Three month reoffending rates for all offenders on the probation 
caseload: the pilot sites, Greater London and England and Wales, baseline year, year 
one and year two60 
 
July 2010 to June 2011
Baseline
July 2011 to June 2012
Project year 1
July 2012 to June 2013
Project year 2
Greater Manchester 9.80% 9.56% 9.06%
Lewisham 8.45% 8.49% 8.08%
Hackney 8.69% 8.08% 7.37%
Croydon 8.40% 8.15% 8.48%
Lambeth 8.05% 8.93% 7.18%
Southwark 8.26% 7.53% 6.48%
Greater London 8.47% 8.18% 7.88%
England and Wales 9.81% 9.66% 9.23%
Source: MOJ, 2011a, 2012c, 2013e. 
 
A2.6 First time entrants to the CJS: adult and young offenders  
Table A2.11 sets out the annual figures for first time entrants in to the adult and youth justice 
systems in England and Wales, for the periods July 2010 to June 2011, July 2011 to June 
2012, and July 2012 to June 2013. These have been drawn from data published by MOJ 
(MOJ, 2013c). No site specific data was available. 
 
                                                
60  The local adult reoffending measure takes a snapshot of all offenders, aged 18 or over, who are under 
probation supervision at the end of a quarter, and combines four such snapshots together. The proportion of 
offenders who reoffend in a three month period is counted. Fuller methodological details are available in MOJ, 
2013d.  
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Table A2.11: First time entrants in to the adult and youth justice system in England 
and Wales, baseline year, year one and year two 
12 month period to the end of June Young offenders Adults All ages
July 2010 to June 2011 (Baseline) 43,179 177,300 220,478
July 2011 to June 2012 (Year 1) 34,098 160,732 194,830
July 2012 to June 2013 (Year 2) 26,071 146,929 173,000
Source: MOJ, 2013c. 
 
 
